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ABSTRACT 
The past year wi l l probably be remembered by treasury managers as the year of derivatives. 
The problems relating to the use or misuse of derivatives have been widely publicized. 
Unfortunately, in the rush to assign blame for huge losses experienced by several companies, 
observers have taken aim at derivative instruments in general and failed to evaluate the real 
cause. The problem relating to derivatives were not created by the instruments themselves, 
but rather by the lack of a framework and internal controls to prevent inappropriate use of 
financing and derivative alternatives. In this project, we wi l l take a more positive approach 
by understanding the operations of financial derivatives, discuss major issues involving 
derivatives and finally, identify any effective risk management technique or legislation that 
can be implemented. 
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Development of financial derivatives 
Financial derivatives are getting more prevalent in the corporate finance arena - the notional 
value of outstanding derivatives grow from one trillion dollars in 1980 to an estimated 
sixteen trillion dollars in 1994. What make derivatives more interesting is notjust its trading 
volume but also numerous incidents on mis-management which led to downfall of well know 
corporations, municipals and financial institutions: Procter & Gamble lost $ 157 million in 
interest rate swap, Orange county California lost $ 1.7 billion in structure notes and end up in 
bankrupcy and of course. Barings lost one billion dollars in Nikkei futures before it went 
bankrupt and was taken over by the Dutch group ING. 
Those regrettable incidents, however, are de facto a consequence of the management conrols 
of institution dealing in derivatives rather than of the products themselves. Derivatives are 
risky. So management needs to put in place sufficiently resilient risk management systems to 
ensure, so far as is humanly possible, that catastrophic losses do not occur. 
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Characteristic of financial derivatives 
Derivatives are financial instruments which values are derived from some underlying 
commodities or securities. The underlying commodities/securities can be anything from 
stock, bonds, currency, gold to strange things like orange juice and pork belly. 
The most popular type of derivatives actively traded in the market includes option, future, 
swaps and other more sophisticated ones like swaptions, caps and collars. There are also 
derivative contracts that are traded over-the-counters, they are mostly issued by merchant 
banks for their own clients to manage their risk, these contracts are usually hold to maturity 
or squared by another contract and seldom trade in secondary market. 
Derivatives were first intorduced to the US in as early as the 18th century when commodities 
were traded in the form of futures contracts. With the expansion of world trade and finance, 
the markets for derivatives usage have grown rapidly, particularly in recent years. 
Derivatives arise from the need of people to modify their risk bearing: Financial investment 
is risky in nature, however, most investors are risk-averse who want to maintain their risk to 
manageable level. Financial derivatives fulfi l that function by changing the risk retum 
relationship of investors. Risk can be regarded as another commodity that people want to get 
rid of. The price to get rid of the risk is the premium they paid on portfolio insurance. By 
allocating risk to the lowest bider (the party most able to bear), overall cost is minimized. 
Thus, derivative ensure efficient allocation of resources with greater certainty. 
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CHAPTER I I 
RISK ENCOUNTERED BY BUSRsJESS AND ITS MANAGEMENT 
Risk encountered by business 
Doing business is inherently risky, manay grades of risk can be encountered. Amongh them 
are: 
1. exchange rate risk 
2. interest rate risk 
3. coummodity price risk 
4. equity price risk 
5. market risk 
6. credit risk 
7. operational risk 
8. legal risk 
9. liquidity risk 
The first four are directly price-sensitivie. A business may be at a disadvantage i f any of 
these prices tum down. Market risk areise when market factors cause a change in the price of 
goods or services. Credit risk occurs, quite simply, i f a customer fails to meet his or her 
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financial obligations for the supply of goods or services. Operational risk could involve, for 
example, the malfunctioning of a crucial piece of production tehnology, a downturn in 
systems, a failure in distribution channels or a strike by employees. Legal risk is the risk that 
an acitvity by a compnay may lead to legal action against it. Liquidity risk areises where 
mismatches in cash inflows and outflows leave insufficient cash to meet current obligations. 
Applications of derivatives in risk management 
Broadly speaking, derivatives can be used for both hedging, speculating and arbitraging. 
Hedging using derivatives 
Derivatives emerged as a safeguard to investor by allowing portfolio insurance. By paying a 
premium, investors can tum unexpected future events into certainty. Investors with open 
position with respect to a particular security can hedge its exposure by entering into an 
opposite transaction with derivatives. 
Arbitrage using derivatives 
Investment bankers who were familiarize with the nature of derivatives, tailor-make specific 
portfolio for their clients. The technique they employed is called “replicating portfolio", by 
bundling derivatives with underlying securities, a new instrument is created which share the 
same risk-retum relationship with another securities. Since their risk-retum characteristic is 
the same, they should demand the same price. Any disparity represent arbitrage opportunity; 
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by buying one portfolio and going short on the other, investors can earn riskless profit. Since 
there are numerous derivatives trading in the market, countless portfolio can be constructed 
using this technique, computer is heavily used to perform that function. The on-going activity 
ensure price parity between different class of securities. 
With derivatives, corporations can hedge against the four price-sensitive risk listed above. 
Specifically, derivatives can be used in the following ways: 
1. To achieve lower funding costs through arbitrage or customized instruments - these 
exploit differences between markets. Where financial market are segmented nationally or 
internationally, derivatives deliver indisputable cost savings for borrowers and higher 
yields for investors. 
2. Diversifying funding sources - companies can obtain finance from one market; they then 
swap all or part of the cash flows into desired currency denominations and rate indices. 
Placing debt with new investors may increase liquidity and reduce funding costs for the 
issuer. 
3. Funding operations in multiple countries at lowest cost - multinationals may fund that 
local borrowing is too small to raise in national market It ma be more cost effective to 
borrow more than they need in such market and swap excess debt into other needed 
currencies. 
4. Hedging the cost of future fixed-rate-debt - companies may be concerned about volatile 
interest rates when considering the future cost of fixed-rate-debt. Delayed-start swaps or 
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forward swaps could fix the interest rate at the time ofthe funding decision. 
5. Hedging the cost of future floating-rate-debt - risk here could be limited by using a cap 
or a swap. 
6. Derivatives can be used to hedge against market risks, managing existing debt or asset 
portfolios; interest rate swaps can be used to adjust the ratio of flxed-to floating-rate 
debt. Currency swaps can transform an obligation in one currency to an obligation in 
another to change the mix of the currency portfolio. 
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CHAPTERIII 
SELECTED DERIVATIVE CASES 
Proctor and Gamble • 
Over the years, P&G had done many kinds of business with Bankers Trust and that 
throughout the banking world had a reeputation for aggressively managing its interest costs. 
In the early 1990's, for example, P&G swapped good-size quantities of its fixed-rate debt 
into floating-rate debt, thereby successfully betting on a drop in rates. In October 1993, still 
expecting rates to fall, P&G talked to Bankers Trust about ways of replacing a fixed-to-
floating swap that was maturing. P&G's specific objective was to negotiate a new $100 
million swap that would (a) again put it in the position of paying floating rates and (b) 
squeeze these to a minimum. Specifically, the company wanted to pay its standard, upper-
crust commercial paper rate (then about 3.25% for six-month paper) minus 40 basis points. 
In the way of big dealers and especially itself. Bankers was prepared to tailor-make a 
contract to fit the client's wishes and then to cover its own flanks by hedging the risk it had 
just taken on. In interest rates, however, as in life, there is no free lunch. I f P&G were to do 
this deal, it would be erquired to take on extra risk, which would come in the form of reduced 
retums i f interest rates did the unthinkable and went up. Keep talking, said P&G. Bankers 
then proposed seversal different deals, one after another, and to each P&G said no. This ping-
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pong had the feel of a never-give-up stock salesman saying. Finally, a deal was struck. In 
early November, suddenly raising their sights to $200 million rather than half that, the two 
parties signed up for a five-year swap whose lverrage sprang from an option include within 
it. For the first six months of the deal, P&G was to pay a floating rate notjust 40 basis points, 
but 75 below commercial paper rates. For the 4½ years after that, the floating rate was to be 
dictated by a brain-twisting formula whose components would include five-year and 30-year 
Treasury rates as of May 4, 1994, which was the six-month anniversary ofthe deal. Under 
the best case for P&G，the floating rate would continue at 75 basis points below commercial 
paper for the full term of the swap. Under the worst case - well, that's what the lawsuit is 
about. 
For all the deal's complexity, the gist of it can be stated quite simply: The swap had a 
“notional”，or principal value of $200 million. Assume that P&G scored to the maximum, 
saving 75 basis points for five years. On the $200 million, that would be $1.5 million a year, 
for a total of 7.5 million. The annual savings would have cut P&G's interest bill, which runs 
around $500 million, by 0.3 of 1%. 
And what risk did P&G accept in retum? For this lure of$1.5 million annually - think ofthat 
as kind of an insurance premium payable to P&G - the company agreed in effect for the next 
six months to act as an insurer covering the risk of interest rate eqrthquakes. With remarkable 
fury, these quakes then occurred: Five-year Treasury rates rose from 5% in early November 
1993 to 6.7% on May 4, 1994, a dramatic increase. P&G's other benchmark, 30-year 
Treasury rates, went from about 6% to 7.3%. 
At an early point in this action-packed period, P&G went so far as to increase the money it 
had on the table. On February 14, 1994, just ten days after the Fed tightened rates, the 
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company netered into another highly leveraged swap geared again to the idea that rates 
would not soar. This swap had a princopal value of about $93 million, a term of 4¾ years, 
and was a wedding band denominated in deutsche marks. The swap bestowed a very 
favourable floating interest rate on P&G for the first year of the swap and, over its fUll term, 
offered the promise of about $949,000 in total savings i f everything went right with a certain 
German “swap rate." These savings would result i f the rate, then 5.35%, did not fall below 
4.05% or rise above 6.10% at any point before Apri l 14, 1995. On the other hand, i f the rate 
popped ou of that band, even for a day, another crazy-quilt formula took over. Under this 
formula, the level of the swap rate on the precise day of Apri l 14, 1995, and its relationship 
to 4.50% would determine what interest rate P&G paid for the last 3¾ years of the swap. 
The danger, then, for P&G occured, first, i f the swap rate jumped out of the prescribed band 
and, second, i f the swap rate was above the 4.50% benchmark rate on Apri l 14, 1995. In that 
event, P&G was to begin pating interest that included its base rate for the first year plus a 
:spread,” And this spread was ten times the difference between 4.50% and the swap rate. So 
once again P&G had sold earthquake insurance. As it happened, the magic date of Apri l 14, 
1995, never precisely came into play. Just 16 days after the contract went into effect, the 
swap rate flew out of the band on the up-side. From all apperances, P&G then stareted to 
realize just how catastrophic things could get with its swaps i f rates kept going up. It 
promptly began trying to mitigate the danger by negotiating a "lock-in interest rate" for each 
of tis swaps. In other words, it wanted to firmly set the rates that it would pay for the duration 
of the swaps, rather than leave itself at the mercy of interest rate movements. In the end, 
dismaying loss figures or not, P&G was forced to accept the deals that Bankers Trust offered. 
By Apri l 11, P&G had locked in rates on both swaps and confronted the horror of insuring 
quakes: For the duration of the first swap, which runs to late 1998，the company agreed to 
pay interest rates that are 1,412 basis point above the commercial paper ratre. And as long as 
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the wedding band binds P&G must pay rates 1,640 basis point the base rate specified by the 
swap. 
Orange County 
The locus of all this trouble was the Orange County Investment Pool, into which the county 
and its cities, school districts, and special districts deposited their tax receipts. This flind 
owned almost no derivative contracts but had buckets of derivative securities. Most of these 
were "structured notes," a name arising from the fact that the issuers of these notes, among 
them such parties as the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), structure their terms to fit the 
investment wishes and opinions of particular institutional buyers. I f he chooses, a buyer with 
strong convictions about the market may sign up for a package that combines the lure of 
above-market retums with extra risk. In other words, he rakes in money i f he's right about 
the market but loses his shirt i fhe's wrong. 
For example, the Orange County pool held large quantities of "inverse floaters," a kind of 
structured note whole value is often linked to the London Interbank Offered Rate, familiarly 
known as Libor. I f Libor goes down, the rates on the floaters do the inverse, going up. That 
means the noteholders eam handsome, above-market rates. But i f Libor goes up, rates on the 
notes head for the cellar. Simultaneously, the market value of the notes declines, since they 
are carrying rates below those generally available in the market. 
Throughout the early 1990s, the manager of the Orange County pool, county treasurer Robert 
L., Citron, had a view - totally accurate - that interest rates were going down and that bonds 
were therefore going up. The yields eamed by the Orange County pool from 1991 to 1993 
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were a marvel, running above 8.5% during a period when bond mutual funds were averaging 
about 7%. Mighti ly impressed, Orange County's municipalities shoved their deposits from 
around $3 billion in 1991 to $7.6 billion in 1994. 
Alongside, all the way, stood Merril l Lynch, who recognized Citron as a very valuable asset. 
Merri l l Lynch helped educate Citron about the derivatives market and sold him derivatives 
securities. It lent his fiind money. And it made itself a leader in underwriting and distribution 
the securities offerings of various Orange County municipalities. Altogether, Merrill and 
Stamenson got a lot of juice out of Citron and friends. 
But as early as October 1992, Merrill began talking to Citron about the volatility that he had 
built into his portfolio and suggesting he reduce it. Citron would have none of that plan, nor 
did he listen to other Merril l cautionary statements that came along later. 
Instead, wanting to back his continuing and now wrongheaded conviction that interest rates 
were still heading down, he piled on borrowings. In 1994 his core stake was the $7.6 billion 
that investors had deposited in the Orange County pool. To that he had added about $12.5 
billion in debt, collaterized by securities held in the ftind's portfolio. Roughly $8 billion of 
the $20 billion total was in structured notes. So there was a derivative problem here, yes. But 
leverage is what really did in Citron and his county. 
The danger gathered force on February 4, 1994, when the Fed first tightened interest rates 
and sent fixed-income securities, including all those that Citron owned, into a grizzly bear 
market. By early December, the Fed had tumed the screws five more times, and six-month 
Libor had gone from 3.6% to 6.8%. Wall Street's brokers, who had provided Citron with 
most of his loans, were demanding additional collateral that he couldn't supply. So some 
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brokers sold their collateral, others mobilized to do so, and Citron's whole jerrybuilt 
contraption tumbled. 
Weeks later, after a team of financial medics had overseen the liquidation of the fund's 
portfolio, the toll could be calculated: Of the $7.6 billion that Orange County's municipalities 
had put up, a stunning $1.7 billion had been lost. The ramifications for these investors are 
large: They are now struggling with their budgets, cutting back services, and fighting among 
themselves as to how the losses should be divided. And Orange County, of course, has filed 
for bankruptcy. 
Meanwhile, Orange County has sued Merril l Lynch, charging that it "encouraged" Citron to 
invest in securities that, by the laws of California, were beyond the bounds of permissible 
risk. Merril l says it did nothing improper and denies being able to tell Citron anything 
Barings Bank plc 
The derivative instrument at the centre of the Barings' affair is the Nikkei 225 futures 
contract. Like the thousands taken out with Barings money, it was launched at Simex in 
1986. Japanese investors regarded it not without trepidation for the risks futures contracts 
carry. But, with Simex gaining a headstart, Osaka began trading the 225 futures two years 
later. The two exchanges have since lived and let live, not least because the tow markets are 
useful for arbitrage. Simex though, has been the more aggressive of the two: it has lower 
margin requirement. As is now widely known, arbitrage of the Nikkei 225 futures had 
become a "bread-and-butter" business of both Barings Futures in Singapore and Barings in 
Tokyo. At its simplest. Barings bought and sold at Osaka and Simex, taking advantage of the 
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minute differences in price at the two exchanges. It is a relatively simple and risk-free trade 
to execute. 
The way it worked at Barings was for Tokyo to take out opposite long (buy) and short 
(sell)positions, respectively, at Osaka and Simex. The Singapore contracts were coursed 
through Barings Singapore, which acted as the broker. With every 3,000 futures contracts it 
had bought in Osaka, for example, it would have short position for 6,000 contract in Simex 
(since the contracts at Simex are half the size of Osaka's). 
Arbitrage opportunities between the two markets are available, but not always for long 
because other players come in, thereby narrowing the spreads. Today the spread may be no 
more than a tick or five points on Simex or ten points on Osaka. Netting of f transaction costs 
the profit can be minuscule. Normally, banks try to job (onsell) the contracts during trading 
day, but on some occasions the positions are held for several weeks or until expiry. This is 
termed lagging, where positions are left open in anticipation of a favourable price movement. 
I f positions remain open up to the expiry date, an auto-settlement procedure wi l l close out 
trades in both exchanges. Arbitrage is not inherently risky since the long and short position 
are matched, a bank with significant arbitrage positions would have no more than a few 
thousand contracts in the order ofUS$ 10 million to US$ 30 million. Towards the end, Nick 
Leeson was running tens of thousands of contracts worth a few hundred million dollars. By 
increasing the size of the trades he must have been hoping to increase his profits. 
But it is now clear that Leeson was not engaged in arbitraging alone. He was also taking 
positions in support of a market view. His market view was that the Nikkei would strengthen. 
His bet was that the US dollar, which had by then fallen to 101, would strengthen. With 
Japanese interest rates at an all time low, he believed the exodus of funds out of Japan would 
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accelerate and weaken the Japanese bond market. A weaker yen would benefit Japanese 
companies in the export and, in tum, improve corporate eamings. Investors would turn 
positive and push the Nikkei 225 up. 
Indeed, suggestions that Leeson had an inside track on the imminent turnaround of the 
Japanese economy may have been based on bullish economic reports published by Goldman 
Sachs, Morgna Stanley and CSFB in the summer of 1994. The release of the reports coincide 
with a re-organization at Barings in London in which the bank decided to concentrate more 
on propriety trading, as suggested by its head of derivatives, Ron Baker. 
A trader in one Japanese broking house recalls that starting October, two months after the re-
organization. Baring's activity in the Nikkei 225 futures began to expand. Towards the end of 
the year, all the leading US investment banks changed their bullish view of the market. 
Leeson, apparently, did not. 
There have been suggestions that Barings Singapore was also on the other side of the Simex 
ledger - that Leeson had been buying the contracts either on behalf of a client (real or 
fictitious) or for Barings Singapore's own account. Cross trading happens when two 
customers, one buying and the other selling (at the same price) deal through the same broker. 
Because Simex adopts an open outcry system, that deal cannot be closed outside the 
exchange; it must be routed into the pit. At the pit, the trader must shout three times both bid 
and offer prices. I f there are no takers, the cross trade is completed between the two parties. 
International exchanges have strict rules that govem cross traders; often, traders must cross 
their arms, and in some markets trading session are videotaped to prevent a trader effectively 
trading with himself. Some say Leeson used the cross trade to build up his positions. That my 
be so, but not necessary all the time. One futures trader says a cross can only happen i f a 
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buyer sees an advantage from a prevailing buoyant market, or have a strong view of the 
market direction. 
Whether Barings Singapore was on the other side of the equation or not is less important than 
it taking a market view of its own. I f Leeson had wanted to speculate in the market, taking 
the other side in cross trade was only one way of increasing his position. Buying Nikkei 
futures directly on Simex was another. Indeed, in November 1994 or earlier, Leeson was 
trading futures and selling options at Simex. One of the most talked about option strategies 
he used was the short straddle. This is a speculative maneuver that involves the simultaneous 
selling of calls and puts at the same strike price. A seller of a straddle takes the view that the 
market would trade within a range. For taking that view, they receive a premium for each call 
and each put. As long as the index stays within a range, they either break even or profits from 
the deal. However, i f the market moves out of this range, the loss to the seller can be 
unlimited. 
One pit trader recalled Leeson would come in with 20 or 50 straddle contracts; moments later 
he would have another 400 or 500 on offer. This did not happen every day, but perhaps once 
a week on average. While these volumes were large compared to those handled by local 
traders, but they was not out the ordinary for one of the large institutions such as Barings. 
When Barings went bust, much was made of the straddles and how they were the cause of 
Leeson's downfall. Leeson sold straddles, it has been suggested, to raise premium to finance 
his purchase ofNikkei futures. 
But, because Leeson kept selling straddles, it is inconceivable that the premium could have 
been used to finance anything other than the margin for new straddles. On a cash flow basis, 
Leeson was no better off. The more straddles he sold, the more margin he had to put up and 
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the more cash he needed to meet them. So why did Leeson sell so many straddles i f not to 
raise cash? The answer is much more mundane : to enhance his profits i f his bet - that the 
Nikkei would rally - turned out to be correct. He had already built an inventory of long 
futures, which provided protection for one leg ofhis short straddle on the call side. 
That was the scene as 1995 began. Leeson had been happily selling straddles and building his 
long positions. Margining by Barings Tokyo, using internal funding and loans from Japanese 
banks, with collateral from other forms of securities, was equally straightforward. On Osaka 
alone, at the beginning of January, Barings had 3.024 net outstanding long contracts, worth 
about ¥ 59 billion, the most of any broker on the Osaka exchange. At the same time, Leeson 
had been building an exposure on Simex. The entire trading strategy, says the Barings 
executive, was limited "only by fund availability". Such was the confidence in the market 
until the Kobe earthquake. 
The Kobe quake struck in the early hours of the moming of January 17. That day, the yen 
weakened by around one yen against the US dollar to a rate of 99.26, while the Nikkei-225 
stock market average fell 89.85 points to 19,241.32. But the Nikkei had been on a downward 
trend since the beginning of the year. The Nikkei continued to slip until the weekend, but on 
Monday, January 23, it slumped below 18,000. In such a bearish and uncertain market, 
traders were concerned about opening new positions. Indeed, on the Monday of January 23 
the gross open position at Simex declined by more than 3,500 contracts. Traders were 
obviously closing out, as a stop-loss measure. And perhaps, Leeson and Barings Tokyo did as 
well. Yet, the next day, January 24，and particularly on January 25, gross open positions at 
Simex rose by 14,000 contracts. At Osaka, open interest rose by more than 8,600 on January 
25 and 26. 
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By January 27, Barings Tokyo's long positions were reported to be 16,850 compared with 
about 7,000 a week earlier. Whether this followed the cue from Barings Singapore is not 
dear. Barings would have spent more than US$ 1.3 bill ion to cover margins at both market 
and on Tokyo;s exposures alone. Add Barings Singapore's long positions, and the margins 
rise to US$ 1.5 billion. The straddle would have suffered loses. On this basis, actual net 
losses alone would have amounted to a few hundred million, i f the Nikkei had not dropped 
flirther. But the damage was there already. 
By the end of January 27，Barings Tokyo's long position at Osaka expanded to 16,852 
contracts. Barings Singapore's would have been double those figures in Simex equivalent 
contracts. The day after Leeson left Singapore on February 23, the volume stood at 15,928 
long contracts for March 9 expiry on Osaka and 1,009 June settlement long position. But the 
Nikkei 225 had since dropped another 700 points to 17,500. When the March contracts had to 
be settled on the lOth, the Nikkei had lost more than 1,400 points since January 27, or 800 
points since February 24. Thus between February 24 and March 10 settlement day, the losses 
had accumulated by another US$ 135 million to US$ 735 million. In the same hectic period, 
the US dollar/yen exchange rate had also fallen by 6% to ¥91. 
The nine days in January had proved crucial. Without substantial change to its position, the 
index had fallen by 9.4% between January and March 10, but Baring's aggregate losses had 
doubled. Not counting the variation margin created by the fall of the Nikkei, the 16,850 long 
Osaka positions would have required margin of ¥101.1 billion (US$ 1.04 billion) at ¥ 6 
mill ion (US$ 61,860) a contract. Of this, a proportion had to be cash: the balance could be 
met by collateral like Japanese Government Bonds. With the Simex margins, this totaled 
US$ 1.3 billion. That was why Baring's head offer had to step in. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CLASSIFICATION OF RISK 
Using derivatives to hedge against business, however, exposed the business to other types of 
risks - it simply substitute one type of risk with another. The major types of risk encountered 
by derivatives are listed below, they are by no means exhaustive and they also apply to other 
financial instruments as well: 
Credit risk 
Broadly defined, credit risk is the risk that a counterparty wil l fail to perform on an 
obligation to the institution. The institution should evaluate both settlement and pre-
settlement risk at the customer level across all products. On settlement day, the exposure to 
counterparty default may equal the full value of any cash flow or securities the institution is 
to receive. Prior to settlement, credit risk is measured as the sum of the replacement cost of 
the position, plus an estimate of the institution's potential future exposure from the 
instrument as a result of market changes. Replacement cost should be determined using 
current market prices or generally accepted approaches for estimating the present value of 
future payments required under each contract, given current market conditions. 
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Market risk 
Market risk is the risk to an institution's financial condition resulting from adverse 
movements in the level or volatility of market prices. The market risks created _ or hedged -
by a future or swap are familiar, although not necessarily straightforward to manage. They 
are exposures to changes in the price of the underlying cash instrument and to changes in 
interest rates. By contrast, the value of an option is also affected by other factors, including 
the volatility of the price of the underlying instrument and the passage of time. In addition, 
all trading activities are affected by market liquidity and by local or world political and 
economical events. 
Liquidity risk 
An institution faces two types of liquidity risk in its derivatives activities: one related to 
specific products or markets and the other related to the general funding of the institution's 
derivatives activities. The former is the risk that an institution may not be able to, or cannot 
easily, unwind or offset a particular position at or near the previous market price because of 
inadequate market depth or because of disruptions in the marketplace. Funding liquidity risk 
is the risk that the institution wi l l be unable to meet its payment obligations on settlement 
dates or in the event or margin calls. Because neither type of liquidity risk is necessarily 
unique to derivatives activities, management should evaluate these risks in the broader 
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context ofthe institution's overall liquidity. When establishing limits, the institution should 
be aware ofthe size, depth and liquidity of the particular market and establish guidelines 
accordingly. 
Operations risk 
Operations risk is the risk that deficiencies in information systems or intemal control wi l l 
result in unexpected loss. This risk is associated with human error, system failures and 
inadequate procedures and controls. This risk can be exacerbated in the case of certain 
derivatives because ofthe complex nature of their payment structures and calculation oftheir 
values. 
Legal risk 
Legal risk is the risk that contracts are not legally enforceable or documented correctly. Legal 
risks should be limited and managed through policies developed by the institution's legal 
counsel (typically in consultation with officers in the risk-management process) that have 
been approved by the institution's senior management and board of directors. At a minimum, 




THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
Developing an effective derivatives policy should be approached like any other strategic 
planning activity. The first step is to define the company's objectives by considering the 
potential uses of derivatives. Any corporate derivatives policy must recognize the fact that 
there may be a number of different objectives that can be attained by using derivatives. A 
good corporate derivatives policy should identify each corporate objective and set parameters 
for derivative that may be used to achieve it. Seldom can one set of guidelines effectively be 
used to achieve all objectives. In addition to specific guidelines for entering into derivatives 
transactions, the derivatives policy should provide for a periodic assessment of all the firm's 
derivatives positions. Depending on the complexity of the transactions, weekly or even daily 
mark-to-market analysis may be appropriate. 
The primary components of a sound risk-management process are the following : a 
comprehensive risk-measurement approach; a detailed structure of limits, guidelines and 
other parameters used to govern risk taking; and a strong management information system 
for controlling, monitoring and reporting risks. These components are fundamental to both 
derivatives and non-derivatives activities alike. Moreover, the underlying risks associated 
with these activities, such as credit, market, liquidity, operations and legal risk, are not new 
to banking, although their measurement and management can be more complex. 
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Accordingly, the process of risk management for derivatives activities should be integrated 
mto the institution's overall risk-management system to the fullest extent possible using a 
conceptual framework common to the institution's other activities. Such a common 
framework enables the institution to manage its risk exposure more effectively，especially 
since the various individual risks involved in derivatives activities can, at times, be 
interconnected and can often transcend specific markets. 
As is the case with all risk-bearing activities, the risk exposures an institution assumes in its 
derivatives activities should be fully supported by an adequate capital position. The 
institution should ensure that its capital position is sufficiently strong to support all 
derivatives risks on a fully consolidated basis and that adequate capital is maintained in all 
group entities engaged in these activities. 
Risk measurement 
One particular problem on managing risk on financial derivatives lie in the difficulties on 
monitoring. Derivatives, like other financial instruments, are reported in the financial 
statement on its market value. The reporting mechanism pose no problem for ordinary 
securities where the maximum exposure is limited to the value of the security. Derivatives, 
however, are highly leveraged so that daily price movement can exceed the face value of the 
derivatives by multiples. Some 〇TC derivative contract do not even show up in financial 
statement. Such off-balance sheet nature of derivatives make financier hard to monitor the 
risk exposure at a particular time and hedge against unfavourable price movement. 
An institution's system for measuring the various risks of derivatives activities should be 
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both comprehensive and accurate. Risk should be measured and aggregated across trading 
and non-trading activities on an institution-wide basis to the fullest extent possible. 
While the use of a single prescribed risk-measurement approach for management purposes 
may not be essential, the institution's procedures should enable management to assess 
exposures on a consolidated basis. Risk measures and the risk-measurement process should 
be sufficiently robust to reflect accurately the multiple types of risks facing the institution. 
Risk-measurement standards should be understood by relevant personnel at all levels of the 
institution - from individual traders to the board of directors - and should provide a common 
framework for limiting and monitoring risk-taking activities. 
With regard to dealer operations, the process of marketing derivatives positions to market is 
fundamental to measuring and reporting exposure accurately and on a timely basis. An 
institution active in dealing foreign exchange, derivatives and other traded instruments 
should have the ability to monitor credit exposures, trading positions and market movement 
least daily. Some institutions should also have the capacity, or at least the goal, of monitoring 
their more actively traded products on a real-time basis. 
Analyzing stress situations, including combinations of market events that could affect the 
banking organization, is also an important aspect of risk measurement. Sound risk-
measurement practices include identifying possible events or changes in market behaviour 
that could have unfavourable effects on the institution and assessing the ability of the 
institution to withstand them. These analyses should consider not only the likelihood of 
adverse events, reflecting their probability, but also ‘worst case，scenarios. Ideally, such 
worst case analysis should be conducted on a institution-wide basis by taking into account 
the effect of default of a large counterparty across both the derivatives and cash trading 
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portfolios and the loan and funding portfolios. 
Such stress tests should not be limited to quantitative exercises that compute potential losses 
or gains. They should also include more qualitative analyses of the actions management 
might take under particular scenarios. Contingency plans outlining operating procedures and 
lines of communication, both formal and informal, are important products of such qualitative 
analyses. 
Limiting risks 
A sound system of integrated institution-wide limits and risk-taking guidelines is an essential 
component of the risk-management process. Such a system should set boundaries for 
organizational risk-taking and should also ensure that positions that exceed certain 
predetermined levels received prompt management attention. The limit system should be 
consistent with the effectiveness of the organization's overall risk-management process and 
with the adequacy of its capital position. An appropriate limit system should permit 
management to control exposures, to initiate discussion about opportunities and risks and to 
monitor actual risk-taking against predetermined tolerances, as determined by the board of 
directors and senior management. 
Global limits should be set for each major type of risk involved in an institution's derivatives 
activities. These limits should be consistent with the institution's overall risk-measurement 
approach and should be integrated to the fullest extent possible with institution-wide limits 
on those risks as they arise in all other activities of the institution. Where appropriate, the 
limit system should provide the capability to allocate limits down to individual business 
units. 
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I f limits are exceeded, such occurrences should be made known to senior management and 
approved only by authorized personnel. These positions should also prompt discussion about 
the consolidated risk-taking activities of the institution or the unit conducting the derivative 
activities. The seriousness of limit exceptions depends in large part upon management's 
approach toward setting limits and on the actual size of individual and organizational limits 
relative to the institution's capacity to take risk. An institution with relatively conservative 
limits may encounter more exceptions to those limits than an institution with less restrictive 
limits. 
Reporting 
An accurate, informative and timely management information system is essential to the 
prudent operation of derivatives activities. Accordingly, the quality of the management 
information system is an important factor in the overall effectiveness of the risk-management 
process. The risk-management function should monitor and report its measures of risks to 
appropriate levels of senior management and to the board of directors. In dealer operations, 
exposures and profit and loss statements should be reported at least daily to managers who 
supervise but do not, themselves conduct those activities. More frequent reports should be 
made as market conditions dictate. Reports to other levels of senior management and the 
board may occur less frequently, but the frequency of reporting should provide these 
individuals with adequate information to judge the changing nature of the institution's risk 
profile. 
Management information systems should translate the measured risk for derivatives activities 
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from a technical and quantitative format to one that can be easily read and understood by 
senior managers and directors using a common conceptual framework for measuring and 
limiting risks. 
Management evaluation and review 
Management should ensure that the various components ofthe institution's risk-management 
process are regularly reviewed and evaluated. This review should take into account changes 
in the activities of the institution and in the market environment, since the changes my have 
created exposures that require additional attention. Any material changes to the risk-
management system should also be reviewed. 
The risk-management functions should regularly assess the methodologies, models and 
assumptions used to measure risk and limit exposures. Proper documentation of these 
elements of the risk-measurement system is essential for conducting meaningfol reviews. 
The review of limit structures should compare limits to actual exposures and should also 
consider whether existing measures of exposure and limits are appropriate in view of the 
institution's past performance and current capital position. 
The frequency and extent to which an institution should re-evaluate its risk-measurement 
methodologies and models depends, in part, on the specific risk exposures created by their 
derivatives activities, on the pace and nature of market changes and on the pace of innovation 
with respect to measuring and managing risks. At a minimum, an institution with significant 
derivatives activities should review the underlying methodologies of its models at least 
annually - and more often as market conditions dictate - to ensure they are appropriate and 
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consistent, such internal evaluations may, in many cases, be supplemented by reviews by 
external auditors or other qualified outside parties, such as consultants who have expertise 
with highly technical models and risk-management techniques. Assumptions should be 
evaluated on a continual basis. 
The institution should also have an effective process to evaluate and review the risks 
involved in products that are either new to it, or new to the marketplace and of potential 
interest to the institution. It should also introduce new products in a manner that adequately 
limits potential losses and permits the testing of internal systems. An institution should not 
become involved in a product at significant levels until senior management and all relevant 
personnel (including those in risk-management internal control, legal, accounting and 
auditing) understand the product and are able to integrate the product into the institution's 
risk-measurement and control systems. 
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CHAPTER V I 
MANAGEMENT OF PARTICULAR RISK EXPOSURE 
Credit risk 
Potential credit risk exposure is measured more subjectively than current exposure and is 
primarily a function of the time remaining to maturity and the expected volatility of the price, 
rate or index underlying the contract. Dealers and large derivatives participants should assess 
potential exposure through simulation analysis or other sophisticated techniques, which, 
when properly designed and implemented can produce estimates of potential exposure that 
incorporate both portfolio-specific characteristics and current market conditions, smaller end-
user may measure this exposure by using ‘add-ons，based on more general characteristics. In 
either case, the assumptions underlying the institution's risk measure should be reasonable 
and i f the institution measure exposure using a portfolio approach, it should do so in a 
prudent manner. 
An institution may use master netting agreements and various credit enhancements, such as 
collateral or third-party guarantees, to reduce its counterparty credit risk. In such cases, an 
institution's credit exposures should reflect these risk reducing features only to the extent 
that the agreements and recourse provisions are legally enforceable in all relevant 
jurisdictions. This legal enforceability should extend to any insolvency proceeding of the 
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counterparty. The institution should be able to demonstrate that it has exercised due diligence 
in evaluation the enforceability of these contracts and that individual transactions have been 
executed in a manner that provides adequate protection to the institution. 
Credit limits that consider both settlement and pre-settlement exposures should be 
established for all counterparties with whom the institution conducts business. As a matter of 
general policy, business with a counterparty should not commence until a credit line has been 
approved. The structure of the credit-approval process may differ among institution, 
reflecting the organizational and geographic structure of each institution. Nevertheless, in all 
cases, it is important that credit limits be determined by personnel who are independent of 
the derivatives function, that these personnel use standards consistent with those used for 
other activities and that counterparty credit lines are consistent with the organization's 
policies and consolidated exposures. 
I f credit limits are exceeded, exceptions should be resolved according to the institution's 
policies and procedures. In addition, the institution's report should adequately provide traders 
and credit officers with relevant, accurate and timely information about the credit exposures 
and approved credit lines. 
Similar to bank loans,〇TC derivatives products can have credit exposures existing for an 
extended period. Given these potentially long-term exposures and the complexity associated 
with some derivatives instruments, an institution should consider the overall financial 
strength of its counterparties and their ability to perform on their obligations. 
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Market risk 
Market risk is increasingly measured by market participants using a value-at-risk approach, 
which measures the potential gain or loss in a position, portfolio or institution that is 
associated with a price movement of a given probability over a specific time horizon. The 
institution should revalue all trading portfolios and calculate its exposures at least daily. 
Although an institution may use risk measures other than value at risk, the measure used 
should be sufficiently accurate and rigorous, and the institution should ensure that it is 
adequately incorporated into its risk-management process. 
Value at risk (VAR) technology - Value at risk (VAR) is a methodology by which 
institutions can evaluate risk across their portfolios. Beyond measurement, the methodology 
is giving institutions flexibility to expand portfolio positions and potentially increase profits 
by better understanding their total risk picture. In essence, VAR is the assessment of how 
much an institution stand to lose at any point in time based upon estimated volatility and 
correlation. As a result of this assessment, institutions may determine the amount of capital 
to set aside to offset trading risks. 
VAR involves three steps: 
First, determine past changes in the underlying rate and prices - this gives the standard 
deviation in daily market movements; 
second, establish a worst-case scenario; finally, calculate the potential loss by inserting the 
worst case into the portfolio valuation and projecting it over the 'unwinding period’ (i.e. the 
span over which a loss can occur). 
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A full analysis would also take into account movements in abnormal markets. This is 
probably best achieved by using stress test models (techniques for determining how products 
perform in abnormal market conditions), which are becoming standard practice. 
An institution should compare its estimated market risk exposures with actual behaviour. In 
particular, the output of any market risk models that require simulations or forecasts offuture 
prices should be compared with actual results. I f the projected and actual results differ 
materially, the assumptions used to derive the projections should be carefully reviewed or the 
models should be modified, as appropriate. 
The institution should establish limits for market risk that relate to its risk measures and that 
are consistent with maximum exposures authorized by its senior management and board of 
directors. These limits should be allocated to business units and individual decision-makers 
and be clearly understood by all relevant parties. Exceptions to limits should be detected and 
adequately addressed by management In practice, some limit systems may include additional 
elements such as stop-loss limits and guidelines that may play an important role in 
controlling risks. 
An institution whose derivatives activities are limited in volume and confined to end-user 
activities may need ,less sophisticate risk-measurement systems than those required by a 
dealer. Senior management at such an institution should ensure that all significant risk arising 
from its derivatives transactions can be quantified, monitored and controlled. At a minimum, 
risk-management systems should evaluate the possible impact on the institution's earnings 
and capital which may result from adverse changes in interest rates and other market 
conditions that are relevant to risk exposure and the effectiveness of derivatives transactions 
in the institution's overall risk management. 
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Liquidity risk 
In developing guidelines for controlling liquidity risks, an institution should consider the 
possibility that it could lose access to one or more markets, either because ofconcems about 
the institution's own creditworthiness, the creditworthiness of a major counterparty or 
because of generally stressful market conditions. At such times, the institution may have less 
flexibility in managing its market, credit and liquidity risk exposures. An institution that 
makes markets in over-the-counter derivatives or that dynamically hedges (dynamic hedging 
refers generally to the continuous process of buying or selling instrument to offset open 
exposures as market conditions change (e.g. an option writer selling an underlying asset as its 
price falls)) its positions requires constant access to financial markets and that need may 
increase in times of market stress. The institution's liquidity plan should reflect the 
institution's ability to tum to alternative markets, such as futures or cash markets, or to 
provide sufficient collateral or other credit enhancements in order to continue trading under a 
broad range of scenarios. 
An institution that participates in over-the-counter derivatives markets should assess the 
potential liquidity risks associated with the early termination of derivatives contracts. Many 
forms of standardized contracts for derivatives transaction allow counterparties to request 
collateral or to terminate their contracts early i f the institution experiences an adverse credit 
event or a deterioration in its financial condition. In addition, under conditions of market 
stress, customers may ask for the early termination of some contracts within the context of 
the dealer's market-making activities. In such situation, an institution that owes money on 
derivatives transactions may be require to deliver collateral or settle a contract early and 
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possibly at a time when the institution may face other flinding and liquidity pressures. Early 
termination may also open up additional, unintended, market positions, management and 
directors should be aware of these potential liquidity risks and should address them in the 
institution's liquidity management process. 
Operations risk 
Institution should manage its operational risk by proper internal control. Internal control can 
be though of as a process by which a company's management and employees keep the risks 
of the business without accepting bounds. The foundation of internal control is build with 
management's own vision of the importance of controls. It is the process and structure used 
by management, under the guidance and oversight of a board of directors, to manage the risk 
inherent in the company's business. Once a firm understands its risk appetite, it can build an 
effective control structure. The control structure can be though of in terms of a pyramid, with 
its activities. 
The board of directors and senior management should ensure the proper dedication of 
resources (financial and personnel) to support operations and system development and 
maintenance. The operations unit for derivatives activities, consistent with other trading and 
investment activities, should report to an independent unit and should be managed 
independently of the business unit. The sophistication of the systems support and operational 
capacity should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the derivatives business 
activity. 
Systems support and operational capacity should be adequate to accommodate the types of 
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derivatives activities in which the institution engages. This includes the ability to efficiently 
process and settle the volumes transacted through the business unit., to provide support for 
the complexity of the transactions booked and to provide accurate and timely input. Support 
systems and the systems developed to interface with the official databases should generate 
accurate information sufficient to tallow business unit management and senior management 
to monitor risk exposures in a timely manner. 
Systems needs for derivatives activities should be evaluated during the strategic planning 
process. Current and projected volumes should be considered together with the nature ofthe 
derivatives activity and the user's expectations. Consistent with other systems plans, a 
written contingency plan for derivatives products should be in place. 
With the complexity of derivatives products and the size and rapidity of transactions, it is 
essential that operational units be able to capture all relevant details of transactions, identify 
errors and process payments or move assets quickly and accurately. This requires a staff of 
sufficient size, knowledge and experience to support the volume and type of transactions 
generated by the business unit. Management should develop appropriate hiring practices and 
compensation plans to recruit and retain high caliber staff. 
Systems design and needs may vary according to the size and complexity of the derivatives 
business. However each system should provide for accurate and timely processing and allow 
for proper risk exposure monitoring. Operational systems should be tailored to each 
institution's needs. Limited end-users of derivatives may not require the same degree of 
automation needed by more active trading institutions. Al l operational system and units 
should adequately provide for basic processing, settlement and control of derivatives 
transactions. 
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The more sophisticated institution's activity, the more need there is to establish automated 
systems to accommodate the complexity and volume of the deals transacted, to report 
position data accurately and to facilitate efficient reconciliation. 
Segregation of operational duties, exposure reporting and risk monitoring from the business 
unit is critical to proper internal control. Proper internal control should be provided over the 
entry of transactions into the database, transaction numbering, date and time notation and the 
conformation and settlement process. Operational controls should also be in place to resolve 
disputes over contract specifications. In this regard, an institution must ensure that trades are 
confirmed as quickly as possible. The institution should monitor the consistently between the 
terms of a transaction as they were agreed upon and the terms as they were subsequently 
confirmed. 
The operations department, or another unit or entity independent of the business unit, shouid 
be responsible for ensuring proper reconciliation of front and back office databases on a 
regular basis. This includes the verification of position data, profit and loss figures and 
transaction-by-transaction details. 
The institution should ensure that the methods it uses to values its derivatives positions are 
appropriate and that the assumptions underlying those methods are reasonable. The pricing 
procedures and models the institution chooses should be consistently applied and well 
documented. Models and supporting statistical analyses should be validated prior to use and 
as market conditions warrant. 
Management of the institution should ensure that a mechanism exists whereby derivatives 
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contract documentation is confirmed, maintained and safeguarded. An institution should 
establish a process through which documentation exceptions are monitored and resolved and 
appropriately reviewed by senior management and legal counsel. The institution should also 
have approved policies that specify documentation requirements for derivatives activities and 
formal procedures for saving and safeguarding important documents that are consistent with 
legal requirements and intemal policies. 
Although operations risks are difficult to quantify, they can often be evaluated by examining 
a series of ‘worst-case，or 'what-if scenarios, such as a power loss, a doubling oftransaction 
volume or a mistake found in the pricing software for collateral management. They can also 
be assessed through periodic reviews of procedures, documentation requirements, data 
processing systems, contingency plans and other operational practices. Such reviews may 
help to reduce the likelihood of error and breakdowns in controls, improve the control ofr isk 
and the effectiveness of the limit system and prevent unsound marketing practices and the 
premature adoption of new products or lines of business. Considering the heavy reliance of 
derivatives activities on computerized systems, an institution must have plans that take into 
account potential problems with its normal processing procedures. 
Legal risk 
Prior to engaging in derivatives transactions, an institution should reasonably satisfy itseif 
that its counterparties have the legal and necessary regulatory authority to engage in those 
transactions. In additional to determining the authority of a counterparty to enter into a 
derivatives transaction, an institution should also reasonably satisfy itself that the terms of 
any contract governing its derivatives activities with a counterparty are legally sound. 
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An institution should adequately evaluate the enforceability of its agreements before 
individual transactions are consummated. Participants in the derivatives markets have 
experienced significant losses because they were unable to recover losses from defaulting 
counterparty when a court held the counterparty had acted outside of its authority in entering 
into such transactions. An institution should ensure that its counterparties have the power and 
authority to enter into derivatives transactions and that the counterparties' obligations arising 
form them are enforceable. Similarly, an institution should also ensure that its rights with 
respect to any margin or collateral received from a counterparty are enforceable and 
exercisable. 
The advantages of netting arrangements can include a reduction in credit and liquidity risks, 
the potential to do more business with existing counterparties within existing credit lines and 
a reduced need for collateral to support counterparty obligations. The institution should 
ascertain that its netting agreements are adequately documented and that they have been 
executed properly. Only when a netting arrangement is legally enforceable in all relevant 
jurisdictions should an institution monitor its credit and liquidity risks on a net basis. 
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CHAPTER V I I 
MANAGEMENT'S ROLE ESf RISK CONTROL 
Firms engaged in significant OTC derivatives activities should have in place comprehensive 
internal risk-management control systems that are commensurate with the scope, size and 
complexity of the activities that have been authorized and the nature and extent of the risks 
they entail. The following overview summarizes the key elements of such risk-management 
control systems. 
Role ofthe governing body or other authorizing body 
Authorizing body 
The OTC derivatives activities of a firm should be conducted pursuant to general authorizing 
guidelines (Guidelines) reviewed and approved the by firm's governing body (i.e. a board of 
directors or its equivalent), a committee of such governing body or committee designated by 
the governing body for the purpose of approving such guidelines (Authorizing Body). The 
Authorizing Body should be selected by the governing body based on, among other relevant 
considerations, the composition and expertise of the governing body, the customary 
allocation of equivalent responsibilities within senior management of the firm and the nature, 
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scope and complexity of the firm's OTC derivatives activities. 
I f the Authorizing Body is not the governing body (or a committee comprised exclusively of 
members ofthe governing body) of the firm the Guidelines, and material amendments to the 
Guidelines, should be reported to the firm's governing body (or a committee comprised 
exclusively of members of the governing body). 
Written guidelines 
The Guidelines should be adopted in written form by the firm's Authorizing Body. 
Relevant considerations 
Relevant factors to be considered by the Authorizing Body in approving Guidelines include 
the firm's overall business strategies and product lines, its tolerance for risk and its general 
risk-management philosophy, its past performance and experience, its financial condition and 
capital leveis, its internal expertise and experience, the sophistication of its risk-monitoring 
and risk-management systems and processes and any regulatory or organizational, 
constraints. 
Authorizing Guidelines 
The Guidelines should address the following areas: 
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1. the scope, or the procedures for determining the scope, of authorized activity or any non-
quantitative limitation on the scope of authorized activities; 
2. the quantitative guidelines for management the firm's overall or constituent risk 
exposure; 
3. the significant structural elements of the firm's risk-monitoring and risk-management 
systems and processes; 
4. the scope and frequency of reporting by management on risk exposures; and 
5. the mechanisms for reviewing the Guidelines. 
Scope of authorized activity 
I f the Authorizing Body wishes to impose specific (non-quantitative) constraints on the scope 
of permitted activities (such as product, market, geographic or trading strategy restrictions), 
the Guidelines should specify any restrictions. I f the Authorizing Body wishes to approve 
only specific activities, the Guidelines should specify the scope of authorized activity. The 
Guidelines may designate one or more individuals within management or management 
committees to perform the function authorizing or restricting activities in particular products 
or markets. 
Guidelines on risk exposure 
The Guidelines should establish market and credit risk exposure guidelines applicable to the 
overall or constituent risk exposures of the firm's derivatives activities risk exposure 
guidelines should be based on factors such as the character of the risk being measured, the 
extent and nature of the derivative products utilized, the risk-measurement methodology 
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employed by the firm and the nature of the firm's counterparties and their industry, country 
or credit rating categories. 
I f the Guidelines do not contain specific limits on risk exposures, they should contain 
quantitative guidelines sufficient to enable management to implement specific quantitative 
limits. The Guidelines may provide that specified individuals or committees within 
management, independent from or senior to the relevant business or trading unit, may 
approve exceptions to the quantitative guidelines in the Guidelines, with material exceptions 
to be periodically reported to the Authorizing Body. 
The Guidelines should also address the degree to which the firm's OTC derivatives-related 
risk exposures should be aggregated, for purposes of risk monitoring and risk management, 
with the related risk exposures arising from other trading activities ofthe firm. 
Risk-monitoring and risk-management structures The Guidelines should address the 
following structure elements of risk monitoring and risk management: 
1. An independent process and check and balances for risk monitoring The Authorizing 
Guideline should define a process for risk monitoring independent from the business or 
trading unit whose activities create the risks being monitored. 
In connection with risk-monitoring systems, the Authorizing Body should also consider 
the need for organizational checks and balances to protect against irregularities or 
inconsistencies in risk measurement and to ensure to the greatest extend practicable that 
the risks posed by OTC derivative products are uniformly and accurately identified and 
evaluated. 
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2. The appropriate degree of independence for risk management The Guidelines should 
define a risk-management function to be performed by specified committees or 
individuals independents from or senior to the relevant business or trading units whose 
activities create risks for the firm. 
3. Authority, resources and information reporting. The Authorizing Body should determine 
that the bodies or personnel performing risk-monitoring and risk-management functions 
have the necessary authority and resources to accomplish their management control 
objectives. The Authorizing Body should also determine that mechanism are in place 
through which information regarding the firm's risk-creating activities wi l l be reported to 
risk-monitoring and risk-management personnel. 
4. Ongoing review of systems and processes. The Authorizing Body should review from 
time to time the firm's risk-monitoring and risk-management systems and processes. 
5. Scope and frequency of reporting. The Guidelines should identify the type, scope and 
frequency of reports to be prepared in connection with the firm's risk-monitoring and 
risk-management systems and processes and to be made available for review by the 
governing body, the Authorizing Body and senior management. Such reports should 
contain information regarding the firm's position and risk exposures to facilitate 
effective oversight of the risk-monitoring and risk-management functions. The 
Authorizing Body should review the scope and frequency of reporting as business and 
market circumstances change. 
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Role of management 
Firm management should ensure that control procedures with respect to the firm's OTC 
derivatives activities are consistent with the firm's Guidelines, including, in particular, 
procedures with respect to the following matters: 
Measurement of risk consistent with prescribed guidelines 
Systems and procedures should be in place to identify and assess the material risks arising 
from the firm's derivatives activities and to assist in managing those risks. 
Risk identification and measurement procedures should address the following risk factors: 
1. Market risk - Mechanism should be in place to measure market risk consistent with 
established risk-measurement guidelines. These procedure should include the capability 
to measure basic components of market risk on a business unit level as well as on a firm-
wide level and to provide the information necessary to conduct ‘stress testing'. 
2. Credit risk - Procedures should be in place to measure the risk that a counterparty wi l l be 
unable to meet its obligations to the firm and to measure credit exposures and 
concentrations against established guidelines. Credit risk-measurement system should 
assess both the firm's current credit exposure to a counterparty and its potential 
exposure. Management should consider the use of risk-reducing practices such as 
bilateral and multilateral netting arrangements, collateral agreements, third-party credit 
enhancement and offsetting exposures to the same counterparty. 
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3. Liquidity risk - Procedures should be in place to measure and provide for potential 
funding requirements that might arise as a result of the impact of market movements on 
cash flows and collateral and margin requirements in light of mismatches in the timing of 
offsetting payment and delivery obligations, taking into account the potential impact of 
contractual provisions, such as early termination provisions, that may give rise to such 
timing mismatches. 
Establishment of risk guideline for business units 
Market risk exposure guidelines should be in place for each of the firm's business units 
Data collection and synthesis 
Processes should be in place through which the data necessary to conduct risk-monitoring 
and risk-management functions effectively is made readily accessible on a timely basis and 
information management systems are available to capture, monitor, analyze and report 
relevant data. 
Policies for valuation methodology 
Systems and procedures should be in place to mark to market the value of derivative products 
or portfolios accurately and on a timely basis, as necessary to implement the risk-monitoring 
and risk-management functions required under the Guidelines. 
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The firm's valuation systems should identify and utilize definitions of value in view of the 
particular OTC derivative products or markets involved and the purposes for which the 
valuation is used, and techniques should be identified to address situations where no market 
prices are readily observable (especially for OTC derivatives). Valuation data collected with 
respect to an instrument or portfolio should be documented, should specify any pricing or 
related assumptions and should be maintained for review by the firm's auditors or other 
authorized examiners. 
Frequency of mark to market 
The frequency with which derivatives positions or portfolios are required to be marked to 
market should be consistent with the risk-management guidelines established by the 
Authorizing Body and should be based on the volatility of the relevant market factor(s) and 
the nature of the firm's risk profile. 
Valuation policy 
A valuation policy should be in place that reflects fair market value and, where appropriate, 
incorporates adjustments for credit quality, market liquidity, funding costs and transaction 
administration costs. 
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Pricing verification procedures 
Routine procedures should be in place, where practicable, for verifying the prices assigned to 
particular derivative products. In addition, procedures and parameters should be in place for 
validation g valuation methodologies on a periodic basis. Any assumptions (such as historic 
correlation and volatility( used in such valuations should be periodically evaluated. 
Model verification procedures 
Statistical or other simulation models for conducting ‘stress tests' and measuring the impact 
or various market movements on the value of derivative products or portfolios should 
themselves be subject to review and validation. Among other objectives, such review and 
validation should compare model predictions against actual market performances and should 
provide for timely identification and correction of any deficiencies in the models. 
Establish a process for identifying and managing deviations from risk guidelines 
A method should be in place for identifying and reviewing situation in which internal risk-
management guidelines have been exceeded and for taking any responsive or remedial action 
that may be necessary. 
Other controls 
Other management control functions include the following: 
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1. Legal risk 
Procedures should be in place to monitor and address the risk that an OTC derivative 
transaction wi l l be unenforceable because (i) the underlying transaction documentation is 
inadequate; (ii) the counterparty lacks the requisite authority or is subject to legal 
transaction restrictions; (i i i) the underlying transaction is impermissible under applicable 
law; or (iv) applicable bankruptcy or insolvency laws limit or alter contractual remedies. 
2. Operational risk 
Procedures should be in place to adequately identify and address any deficiencies in the 
firm's operating systems (e.g. database management, trade entry, trade processing，trade 
confirmation, payment, delivery, receipt, collateral management, valuation and related 
information systems) and to contain the extent of losses arising from unidentified 
deficiencies. Operation risk measurement and management procedures should, as 
appropriate, also incorporate the use of disaster recovery planing or related techniques 
for reducing the firm's exposure to operational risks. 
3. Designate authority to commit on trades 
Procedures should be in place to authorize certain employees to commit the firm to 
particular types of derivatives transactions, to specify any quantitative limits on such 
authority and to provide for the oversight of their exercise of such authority. Authorized 
employees should understand the risk exposures arising from the product in question, the 
applicable risk-management guidelines and the management control procedures for 
documenting recording and reporting the transaction. 
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4. Role of external audit functions 
External auditors should periodically review the integrity of risk-monitoring and risk-
management functions. 
5. Approve internal controls for documentation, adequacy of operational procedures and 
risk-reduction procedures 
Procedures should be in place to provide for adequate documentation of the principal 
terms of OTC derivatives transactions and other relevant information regarding such 
transactions. Such documentation should be appropriately maintained and should be 
made available to the firm's auditors or other authorized examiners. Internal operational 
systems should also provide for effective tracking and process of OTC derivatives 
transactions from their initiation to their settlement 
6. Provide for an adequate level of professional expertise for risk monitoring and risk 
management 
Adequate personnel resources with appropriate expertise should be committed to 
implementing effectively the firm's risk-monitoring and risk-management systems and 
processes. 
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CHAPTER VI I I 
CONCLUSION 
While financial derivatives have been around for a very long time, the past decade and a half 
has seen the variety and complexity of the available derivatives increase markedly. When 
used strategically, derivatives can be very effective tools to mitigating risks whereas when 
used to speculate, they can be trouble, especially i f one is unaware that he or she is betting. 
Risk management is a dynamic process that requires a company to monitor the policies and 
procedures governing the company's direction. An effective risk management process should 
ensure that: 
• risk-management duties are properly supervised; 
• any segregation of management duties is dearly identified; 
• position and risk are coherently reported 
• transactions are properly documented 
• the roles of the players are adequately defined 
Companies need to decide and make clear whether responsibility for certain functions is to 
be centralized or decentralized. A useful rule is that responsibilities for different functions 
should be spread. 
5 0 
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• The treasury should handle the risk-management strategy. 
• Accounting should deal with record keeping, processing and settlement. 
• The legal department should arrange contractual relationships. 
• The credit control department should deal with the assessment of counterparties. 
This is by no means an exhaustive list but it indicates the kind of considerations which 
should underscore management thinking when deciding on division of responsibilities. It 
should also help to promote effective teamwork on the issues. 
Management should establish a policy for general risk management and specifically for 
derivatives usage. It may want to form a risk-management committee to draw up the strategy 
and monitor its implementation. Any such strategy should be reasonably detailed and 
specific. Too many generalities can lead to confusion, ambiguity and misinterpretation. A 
policy to hedge may be stated but without describing what constitutes a hedge may be stated 
but without describing what constitutes a hedge or identifying which products may be used. 
The treasury should set clearly the nature of the policy it intends to pursue and which 
products it wi l l use. Communication throughout the organization is essential so that everyone 
who needs to know is aware of the strategy. 
This strategy should be approved by the executive and board of directors. Meetings should be 
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